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It has been argued that romantic love is an intrinsically moral phenomenon – a 
phenomenon that is directly connected to morality. The connection is elucidated in terms 
of reasons for love, and reasons of love.  It is said that romantic love is a response to moral 
reasons – the moral qualities of the beloved. Additionally, the reasons that love produces 
are also moral in nature. Since romantic love is a response to moral qualities and a source 
of moral motivation, it is itself moral. This chapter aims to cast doubt on both these claims. 
By employing the model of emotional rationality it shows that a moralistic fallacy is 
committed when reasons for love are construed as moral. Reasons of love are also not 
essentially moral but rather of both moral and nonmoral kinds. Reasons of love are in 
part determined by cultural narratives and norms pertaining to love. Romantic love is 
not moral in nature. Morality is extrinsic to love.    
 





Philosophical discussions of romantic love1 are often concerned with its moral 
dimensions. Indeed, some leading accounts characterize it as an intrinsically moral 
phenomenon. This means either or both of two things: (1) when in love, we respond to 
the moral qualities of our beloveds, and (2) love is the primary motivation for treating 
our beloveds morally. I dispute both of these claims. Using key concepts of the rationality 
of emotions, I argue that attempts to categorize romantic love as an intrinsically moral 
phenomenon relying on claim (1) commit a moralistic fallacy. They construct idealized 
accounts of love rather than providing a realistic picture of it. As regards (2), reasons of 
love are not reducible to moral reasons. Although they can be moral, they are not so 
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exclusively. Ultimately, they belong in their own category, which isn’t determined by the 
kind of valuing love involves. Rather, reasons of love are grounded in the lover’s internal 
love model, informed by the lover’s attachment style and experience, and by social norms 
pertaining to romantic love. Since both are highly variable, they are unlikely to coincide 
with morality. Moral norms, therefore, are extrinsic to love. Romantic love is not an 
intrinsically moral phenomenon.  
I begin by sketching a psychological profile of romantic love in Section I, 
differentiating between passionate and companionate love. Philosophers often complain 
that either one or the other should not be considered romantic love. For the purposes of 
this chapter either one or both of them together are what the discussion of the morality 
of love is about. In Section II, I prepare the ground for the discussion of reasons for love 
by distinguishing between prudent, moral, and aptness norms used to assess the 
rationality of emotions. The conflation of these norms can result in a moralistic fallacy. 
This happens when we infer from the claim that an emotional occurrence is immoral that 
it must also be irrational. Section III lays out preliminary distinctions required to clarify 
the possible connections between romantic love and morality. It demonstrates that when 
assessing an emotional state in moral terms, avoiding the moralistic fallacy requires that 
emotion’s aptness or fittingness conditions be the same as the conditions for that 
emotion’s moral assessment. Section IV examines two accounts that attempt to show that 
reasons for love are moral reasons by appealing to the moral features of the beloved. Both 
are found to commit a moralistic fallacy. Section V scrutinizes three attempts to reduce 
reasons of love to moral reasons. They are the Care View, the Duties of Trust View, and 
the Moral Deliberation View. Each view gets something right about morality and 
romantic love. Each one, however, ultimately fails to show that reasons of love are 
reducible to moral reasons. Reasons of love can be of both moral and nonmoral kinds. 
This is in part explained by the influence of the cultural narratives of love, a lover’s 
history and attachment style, and other factors. I conclude that because neither reasons 
for nor reasons of love are intrinsically moral, morality is external to love. Romantic love 




Romantic Love: Definitions 
 
Although there is no consensus on how to best define romantic love, there are two 
common contenders. First, romantic love can be characterized as a passionate, obsessive 
state. It is illustrated by phrases such as being ‘in love’, falling ‘head over heels’, or feeling 
‘madly in love’. One finds this sort of love in the stories of Romeo and Juliet, Abelard and 
Heloise, Tristan and Isolde. Its psychological profile is described by Dorothy Tennov as 
having intrusive thoughts about the beloveds, violent feelings and desires directed at 
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them, and motivation to seek their company and intimacy (Tennov 1999/1979; Fisher 
1992, 2004). It is also characterized by the idealization of the beloveds, to whom the lovers 
attribute special and unique value, not found in anyone else (Stendhal 1822/1967; Singer 
2009a; Grau 2006; Grau and Pury 2014).  
 Some dismiss this definition of romantic love as referring to nothing more than 
infatuation or crush, not serious or ‘real’ love (cf. Frankfurt 2004; Velleman 1999). 
Spontaneous and whimsical, it is bound to end quickly. At best, it will pave the way for 
a deeper kind of love, the love that lasts: companionate love. Companionate love is 
characterized by a much calmer emotional state, an acquired intimacy, understanding, 
and trust between the lovers (Hatfield and Rapson 1996; Wang and Nguyen 1995; Kim 
and Hatfield 2004). Though less intense, companionate love “is a warm feeling of 
affection and tenderness that people feel for those with whom their lives are deeply 
connected” (Kim and Hatfield 2004, 175). It is closely associated with friendship, and 
involves shared values, strong and deep attachment, feelings of comfort, and a long-term 
commitment. It develops over a long period of time and can last for years, even a lifetime 
(Hatfield and Rapson 1996; Contreras, Hendrick, and Hendrick 1986; Hendrick, 
Hendrick, and Adler 1988; Kim and Hatfield 2004). 
 The dismissal of passionate love as not serious or real seems to rest on the 
presumed tradeoff between intense passion and deeper connection. One might wonder 
whether companionate love can justifiably bear the title ‘romantic’. It can, no doubt, 
retain some or obtain new romantic elements; but it need not arise from passionate love 
in the first place. Passionate love, on the other hand, should not be dismissed as foolish 
and pointless. As is illustrated in many works of fiction and films, it can be very powerful 
and fulfilling, and also involve a deep mode of connection. 
 The distinction between passionate and companionate love can be useful, but for 
the purposes of this chapter it makes no difference. I take romantic love to be passionate 
love that can transform into companionate love, while maintaining some of the elements 
of passionate love. This conception is sufficient to discuss the morality of both reasons for 
and reasons of love. 
 
 
Emotions and rationality 
 
I argue elsewhere that romantic love is not an emotion but rather a syndrome, comprising 
a variety of affective, cognitive, and behavioral dispositions (Pismenny and Prinz 2017; 
Pismenny 2018). Nevertheless, romantic love essentially involves vast if not unlimited 
emotional dispositions. I will, therefore, use the various rational norms applicable to 
emotions as a framework for thinking about the rationality of love. This will be useful for 
two reasons: first, it will help elucidate the relationship between love and reasons, and 
second, it will help zoom in on the different relationships between love and morality.  
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 Emotions are intentional states (Deonna and Teroni 2012; Tappolet 2016). They 
represent certain features of the world and ourselves to us. While the question of 
intentionality of emotions is a complex one, there are at least two kinds of 'object' of 
emotions: the target, which is the primary object of the emotion, and the formal object 
(Kenny 1963). The target of an emotion is that at which the emotion is directed. The formal 
object represents the value that supervenes on the focal properties of the target (de Sousa 
1987). For example, fear of a dog is directed at a dog, its target, while its formal object is 
dangerousness. To fear the dog is to attribute to it the property of being dangerous. 
Emotions, therefore, are evaluations of objects and situations relevant to those who are 
experiencing them, and each emotion type is individuated by the specific formal object 
that it attributes to its target. 
 Insofar as each emotion represents the value it is about, each emotion has its own 
standard of correctness. An emotion is assessed for correctly or incorrectly representing 
its target as having a particular value. This standard of correctness is the aptness or 
fittingness of emotions (de Sousa 1987). An emotion fails to be apt when the value it 
attributes to its target cannot be shown to be grounded in it. For instance, my anger at my 
friend for being late is inapt when in fact she is on time, and I have simply 
misremembered the hour we have agreed upon. Since showing up on time does not 
ground offensiveness, my anger is unfitting. Perhaps my anger is also inapt if she has left 
on time but was late because her subway train broke down, and she had no way of 
alerting me as she had no reception underground. On the other hand, if she simply 
managed her time poorly, or did not think it was important to meet me on time, my anger 
at her is fitting and justified, as her attitude and behavior are really insulting. 
            Even though aptness is the intrinsic norm of rational assessment for any emotion 
(as it stems directly from the emotion’s meaning), it is not the only norm of rationality 
applicable to them. We often assess emotions from prudential and moral points of view. 
One might say that I ought not to be angry with my friend for being late, as my anger is 
just a waste of energy. My anger will not undo her lateness. My anger is unproductive 
and thus irrational. Or one might insist that patience is a virtue, and therefore, my anger 
reveals a character flaw. That amounts to regarding my anger as inappropriate in the 
sense of constituting a moral failure on my part. Furthermore, emotions are also subject 
to meta-attitudes such as those stemming from cultural norms of feeling and display. For 
instance, in the U.S. a woman’s anger is more likely to be deemed inappropriate than a 
man’s (Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015). These meta-attitudes affect how women 
experience and express anger. They often feel unjustified in feeling it, and are afraid of 
revealing it lest they be labeled hysterical, etc.   
Although it is common to assess emotions from prudential and moral standpoints, 
it is important to keep these assessments separate from that of aptness. Indeed, to run 
together aptness and prudential or moral assessments is to commit a prudential or a 
moralistic fallacy, respectively. As Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson put it, “[T]o 
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commit the moralistic fallacy is to infer, from the claim that it would be wrong or vicious 
to feel an emotion, that it is therefore unfitting” (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000). Aptness or 
fittingness is a distinct mode of correctness of emotions.     
Romantic love too can be assessed in terms of these norms. From a meta-attitude 
perspective, in the West, romantic love is considered extremely important for a happy 
and meaningful life, as well as the most important reason to get married. In some Eastern 
cultures, by contrast, it is considered unstable and ephemeral, and a poor basis for 
matrimony (Beach and Tesser 1988; Branden 1980; Levine et al. 1995; Rothbaum and 
Tsang 1998, Triandis 1990; Dion and Dion 1996; Neto et al. 2000, Nelson and Yon 2019). 
A given case of love may be prudentially sound when it helps further one’s goals such as 
marriage and childrearing, or impractical as in the cases of unrequited love, or love not 
directed at one’s partner in a monogamous relationship. The fittingness conditions of love 
(if there are any) correlate with the formal object of love – lovability – the evaluative 
property in virtue of which the beloved is lovable. To elucidate this evaluative property, 
we would need to identify a set of properties that ground it as we have done in the cases 
of fear and anger. We can assess love from a moral standpoint by examining whether 
reasons for love are moral reasons, and whether reasons of love motivate us to act 
morally. In the following sections I discuss each question in turn.    
          
 
Love and Morality: Preliminary Distinctions 
  
Evaluating reasons for love from a moral standpoint can take different forms. First, it 
might be thought that morality dictates that we love certain people—though it seems 
very unlikely that we owe romantic love to anyone.2  
Second, we might evaluate reasons for love3 as morally appropriate or 
inappropriate. Perhaps loving someone for their money is morally condemnable, while 
loving someone for their character is morally praiseworthy. On a view of this kind, the 
lovability of one’s beloved is grounded in their character traits, which may or may not be 
moral. If so, love may be apt when the beloved is loved for their humor, wit, attentiveness, 
and happy disposition (see Keller 2000). Here the aptness and moral assessments are 
clearly distinct. While an instance of such love may be fitting, it may at the same time be 
morally problematic if it takes the form of an adulterous affair, or manifests itself through 
abuse, or becomes a fetishism focusing exclusively on some of the beloved’s physical 
qualities. Similarly, love may be inapt but morally unproblematic, as in the case of the 
lover’s misattribution of qualities—if any such exist—that would ground lovability of the 
beloved. One may be deluded or tricked into thinking that the beloved is witty, funny, 
and charming but over time discover that it was all a fantasy or an act. While the beloved 
might have acted immorally, the lover’s love was not morally devious but simply 
grounded in false assumptions.    
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Third, it might be that reasons for love are moral reasons in so far as they pick out 
only moral qualities of the beloved. On such a view, the beloved is loved for their moral 
character (Abramson and Leite 2011). Construed this way, romantic love is an 
intrinsically moral phenomenon since its fittingness conditions are defined by the moral 
virtues of the beloved. It is apt only when someone is loved for their moral character and 
inapt when the moral character in the beloved is lacking, or the beloved is loved for some 
nonmoral features.       
A worry arises with respect to this last consideration: aren’t we committing a 
moralistic fallacy by conflating the fittingness norms of love with moral norms? It might 
seem so since the same moral qualities of the beloved are used to assess love for both of 
these norms. However, when the fittingness norm of love is defined by moral qualities, 
no fallacy need be committed. It might be that romantic love just is (or is like) a moral 
emotion, in requiring only moral features to ground the target’s possession of the 
properties that define its formal object (D'Arms and Jacobson 2000; Gibbard 1990). 
Emotions like guilt, shame, contempt, indignation, and anger are often cited as examples 
of moral emotions because they deal with notions like personal moral failures, moral 
failures of others, justice, fairness, desert, and harm. When these emotions are directed at 
moral features of the situation, they are moral emotions.  
It is likely, however, that not all cases of these emotions are purely moral cases 
(Prinz 2007). For I may be feeling angry that the car broke down, ashamed of my body, 
guilty of wasting time on Twitter, contemptuous of my friend’s poor taste in music. 
Arguably, these are not examples of moral failures. Thus, if there are purely moral 
emotions (such as indignation), there are very few of them (Gibbard 1990; Prinz and 
Nichols 2010).  
If love’s fittingness conditions are determined by moral properties, then love is an 
intrinsically moral attitude. Nothing but the lovability of the beloved is relevant to love’s 
fittingness. But we could still make a further moral assessment of a given instance of love. 
While an instance of love is grounded in the moral qualities of the beloved, it might still 
be morally problematic because it is adulterous or abusive. Fittingness and moral 
assessments can still be kept apart, so as to avoid the moralistic fallacy.        
 This last type of case does not preclude a very intimate connection between love 
and morality. Moral features, it could be held, are defining features of love. Without them 
love is unfitting: it gets things wrong either about the beloved or about what is worth 
loving. Lovability, in such cases, would be a moral property, and the function of love is 
to correctly identify those who are lovable. 
 
 




While it is conceivable that reasons for love are moral in nature, is it plausible that they 
are? What arguments can be offered in support of lovability being a moral property? Two 
accounts have attempted to show this. The first is that of David Velleman, who argues 
that lovability is grounded in the beloved’s personhood – their rational will and capacity 
to value (Velleman 1999). The second, due to Kate Abramson and Adam Leite, argues 
that lovability is grounded in the beloved’s moral qualities (Abramson and Leite 2011). I 
examine each in turn.  
 David Velleman models his view of love on the Kantian account of respect. He 
states that from the phenomenological perspective love feels like an arresting awareness 
of the person’s value that is grounded in their personhood (Velleman 1999, 360). Persons 
have unconditional moral worth because they are rational and possess the capacity to 
value. Love is a response to and an appreciation of this worth (Velleman 1999, 365)4.  
 For Velleman, love is an intrinsically moral emotion since it is the moral value of 
persons that love is responding to. Love is apt when the beloved is loved for their 
personhood. Love is inapt when the beloved is loved for some other qualities such as 
their good looks and delicious cooking, or if the beloved is not a person.      
 Velleman holds that one advantage of his view is that the beloved is valued the 
way anyone would want to be valued – for who they truly are, and also as irreplaceable:  
for “[w]hat makes something truly irreplaceable is a value that commands appreciation 
for it as it is in itself, without comparison to anything else, and hence without 
substitutions” (Velleman 1999, 369).  
In his attempt to ground lovability in personhood, Velleman's account shows too 
much and too little.5 It shows too much since most cases of romantic love involve persons, 
and so love will rarely be inapt. Every person is equally lovable since all persons possess 
the same immeasurable value of dignity grounded in personhood. It shows too little, 
since few would recognize a universal abstract property of personhood or rational will 
as their reason for loving their beloveds. Rather it is the particularity of the beloved that 
love highlights and not a universal bare core that persons might have. Velleman 
acknowledges that we come to love our beloveds on the basis of the singular expression 
of their personhood, which seems designed to capture the particularity of the beloved 
(Velleman 1999, 371-2). However, since he insists that it is not the particular qualities that 
constitute the beloved’s lovability, this point only explains rather than justifies a given 
instance of love.  
In effect, Velleman’s account commits a moralistic fallacy since his reasons for 
picking personhood as the quality that grounds lovability are moral ones. He wants to 
resolve the conflict between love and morality that arises, according to Kant, due to love’s 
partiality6; he also thinks that if we love for some other qualities, our loves are superficial 
and are not loves that take our beloveds as ends in themselves. But while we might value 
our beloveds as moral beings, valuing them finally need not be reduced to the Kantian 
notion of ends in themselves.7 
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Kate Abramson and Adam Leite attempt to show that love is an intrinsically moral 
emotion by arguing that love is fitting when it is a response to moral qualities of the 
beloved (Abramson and Leite 2011). They point out that when asked why one loves their 
beloved, it is typical to list the beloved’s moral character traits (Abramson and Leite 2011, 
678). This kind of response feels more legitimate than appeals to convenience or the 
beloved’s good looks. This may be so in part because we feel that moral traits best capture 
a person’s essence: only thus can a person be loved for who they are. On this view, love 
is apt when the beloved is loved for their moral character traits. It is inapt if the beloved 
does not possess good moral character for which the lover takes themselves to be loving 
them, or if the beloved is loved for qualities other than moral. 
Though it seems plausible to identify love’s fittingness conditions by attending to 
answers commonly given to the question of why one loves, there are three main problems 
with this strategy. First, it is important to determine whether those answers are correct. 
If love’s function is to track moral qualities then we should expect these qualities to serve 
as grounds for falling in love. Generally, there is a correlation between what makes 
emotions apt and their eliciting conditions. Whether the correlation exists is an empirical 
question. Abramson and Leite rely on characters from Sense and Sensibility to illustrate 
their view. But one need not look far for counter examples: Mr. Darcy, Rhett Butler, 
Eugene Onegin, Don Juan, Heathcliff, Dorian Gray, Carmen, Salome, Nana, Lulu, Hedda 
Gabler are some examples of romantic heroes and heroines with questionable or devious 
characters. A romantic hero is often a bad boy or an inconsiderate girl, someone with 
charisma and character rather than moral virtue. Indeed, exhibiting rudeness and 
standoffishness as a romantic strategy is more likely to catch attention, while being nice 
is likely to land one in the ‘friend zone’8 (for discussion see McDaniel 2005; Ahmetoglu 
and Swami 2012). If it is objected that such cases do not exemplify ‘real love’ because they 
fail to be grounded in moral qualities, that would be manifestly begging the question 
against the examples just provided. 
Second, whether moral properties are the grounding properties of lovability is 
difficult to determine through self-report, since asking why one loves often arises when 
the lover’s family or friends disapprove of their choice of love object. This puts the lover 
on the defensive, and they may try to appease the questioner by trying to rectify the 
beloved’s flaws in the eyes of the accusers. Pointing to these qualities does not justify 
one’s romantic love from the aptness point of view. Instead, attempting to show that the 
beloved is a good person evokes either prudential norms to reassure those concerned that 
the lover’s wellbeing not be negatively affected by the beloved, or moral norms as an ex-
post-facto rationalization to appease a critic.  
Third, when faced with the demand to justify one’s love, one is already in love. 
Indeed, love makes us idealize our beloveds, attaching positive values to their trivial 
traits, and underplaying or rationalizing their shortcomings. We inflate the goodness of 
our partners and of our relationships in comparison to others (Rusbult and Buunk 1993; 
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Martz et al. 1998; Murray, Holmes, and Griffin 1996a, 1996b; Showers and Kevlyn 1999). 
For this reason, referencing the practice of referring to the positive character traits of the 
beloved in justifying one’s love is unhelpful, since this practice does not reveal the 
grounds for one’s love but rather provides rationalizations for its existence. Or it might 
simply display the qualities that the lover lingers on when thinking about the beloved. 
Abramson and Leite commit a moralistic fallacy in taking lovability to be 
grounded in moral character. Their project is not to identify lovability as an evaluative 
property to which we respond with love. Instead, they construct a moral ideal of love 
according to which the lover should love the beloved for their moral virtues.9 However, 
since there is no actual correlation between love’s eliciting conditions and the moral 
character of the beloveds, picking moral virtues as grounding features of lovability is 
arbitrary.  
Of course Abramson and Leite could insist that love is essentially morally good by 
definition. Anything else simply cannot count as ‘real love’ even if it fits the psychological 
profile described in Section I. I have been trying to show that such a move begs the 
question. Romantic love is not an intrinsically moral emotion because lovability cannot 
be confined to moral qualities. It need not be grounded in either personhood or moral 
character traits. Moralizing reasons for love results in conflating aptness and moral 
norms, and in over-intellectualizing love.  
Nonetheless, some might claim that love is intrinsically moral because the reasons 
that love produces are moral reasons. I explore this possibility in the next section.        
 
 
Are Reasons of Love Moral Reasons? 
 
If lovability were a moral property, and love were a fitting response to it, it might have 
been reasonable to expect love to generate moral reasons for actions: for if love were 
essentially a recognition and appreciation of the beloved as a moral agent, it would give 
one a reason to treat them as such. But since lovability is not necessarily a moral property, 
valuing the beloved does not obviously generate moral reasons. Nevertheless, reasons of 
love might still be moral reasons. Indeed, quite independently of claims about reasons 
for love, some have argued that reasons of love are reducible to moral reasons. Others 
argue that reasons of love are sui generis. In this section I hope to show that a hybrid 
account of the reasons of love is most plausible: reasons of love can be of either kind.  
To do so I consider three views according to which reasons of love are moral 
reasons. First, on what I call the Care View, reasons of love are moral reasons because 
they are concerned with promoting the beloved’s wellbeing for its own sake. And this is 
what morality is inherently about – caring for people. Second, on what I call the Duties 
of Trust View, reasons of love are moral reasons because a romantic relationship is based 
on trust, and trust creates moral obligations. Third, on what I call the Moral Deliberation 
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View, reasons of love are moral reasons because moral reasoning is indispensable in 
practical deliberation generally, not excluding situations involving romantic love.  
 Before considering these three views, it is worth emphasizing that romantic love 
has a motivational component. As discussed in sections I and II, love is an affective state 
(like an emotion) or better, a syndrome that includes dispositions to experience affective 
states. Emotions such as anger and fear move us to aggress against the wrongdoer, or to 
freeze or flee. If love is like emotions in this regard, we should expect it to provide a set 
of motivations of its own. Indeed, recall that romantic love is characterized by the 
motivation to seek the beloved’s company and intimacy. This motivation is enabled both 
in passionate and companionate types of love. Typically when in love, the lover seeks 
proximity to the beloved, longs for their company, desires reciprocity, etc. Over time the 
lover develops an attachment to the beloved, which motivates the lover to sustain the 
ongoing relationship, and when apart, to long for union (Fisher 1998). Romantic love 
moves the lover to achieve certain ends.    
Several authors have argued that the motivational force of love can be harnessed 
by the will. Robert Solomon (1973) went as far as to claim that love and other emotions 
could be chosen. Without going quite so far, Harry Frankfurt is among those who 
characterize love as volitional. He says it is a “configuration of the will that consists in a 
practical concern for what is good for the beloved” (Frankfurt 2004, 43). He defines love 
as “a disinterested concern for the existence of what is loved, and for what is good for it” 
(Frankfurt 2004, 42). Thus, to love is to care for the beloved’s wellbeing, and to promote 
it for its own sake (see also Taylor 1976; Newton-Smith 1989; LaFollette 1996; Soble 1997; 
White 2001; Helm 2010; Abramson and Leite 2011; Wallace 2012, Smuts 2014)10.  
Frankfurt rejects the idea that reasons of love are moral reasons on several 
grounds. First, the kind of care and valuing that love generates is partial – it is directed 
towards a particular individual – the beloved – who acquires a special nonfungible value 
in virtue of being loved (Frankfurt 2004, 39-41). Whereas one might care for the sick or 
the poor as a generic object: any sick or poor will do, any one of them qualifies as a proper 
object of care (Frankfurt 2004, 44). Second, for Frankfurt love has its own reasons and 
duties that stem directly from the love attitude and the value love has for the lover as 
opposed to moral principles (Frankfurt 1998). He says, “I believe that it is possible to give 
a better explanation of the unquestionable truth that loving someone or something entails 
that there are certain things we must do — a more authentic and more illuminating 
explanation than one that resorts to the notion of moral obligation” (Frankfurt 1998, 6). 
He continues, “The imperatives of love are not grounded in the strictures of moral 
obligation but in the compelling facts that loving is of decisive importance to us and that 
it is rather hard to come by” (Frankfurt 1998, 7). Thus, reasons of love are not reducible 
to moral reasons because love as a species of caring generates reasons of its own. This 
brings us to the first of three views to be assessed.  
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According to what I call the Care View, reasons of love are moral reasons because 
love has a central role to play in morality. Care, as disinterested concern for the other, 
could take the form of treating the other as an end. In that regard care is like love, if not 
identical to love, and a capacity for love might need to be cultivated in order to value the 
well-being of others as much as one’s own.11 As Brook Sadler points out, “a commitment 
to being morally attentive to another, to treating her as an end-in-herself, is constitutive 
of a caring relationship with the other, thus blurring the line between an ethics that 
emphasizes duty and obligation and an ethics of care” (Sadler 2006, 252).12   
Proponents of the Care View argue that acting from care is a paradigmatic 
example of moral action. For instance, Katrien Schaubroeck in her “Reasons of Love” 
points out that Susan Wolf’s famous account of moral saints mischaracterizes morality as 
moralizing. Wolf’s moral saint is concerned with the right, and one’s duty to uphold it to 
the exclusion of all else. However, Schaubroeck argues, a truly good moral agent is likely 
to be concerned with the morally good actions themselves rather than mere commitment 
to moral principles (Schaubroeck 2019, 295-6). One wants to help those in need because 
they are in need, not because one has a duty to help. We want to help because we care 
about the well-being of others. Frankfurt is right that love singles out a particular 
individual while moral considerations may concern generic classes of people. However, 
since our moral actions are often directed at particular individuals even if we are not in 
love relationships with them, caring is arguably at the core of our moral concern for them. 
Caring is central to some moral theories as well as many theories of love. Love is 
a paradigm of caring, an ideal towards which we might strive in our moral treatment of 
others: “[L]ove [is] an enabling condition of morality in the sense that it provides a firm 
experience with recognizing the individuality of another being” (Schaubroeck 2019, 297). 
But does it follow that reasons of love are moral reasons? 
For four reasons we should resist the inference. Reasons of love are not moral 
reasons, nor are moral reasons reasons of love. 
First, although care may be essential both to moral concerns and to love, neither is 
reducible to care. Nor are love and morality reducible to one another. While loving 
involves caring, not all caring involves loving. I might care for the well-being of my 
neighbors, without at the same time having the kind of emotional, cognitive, volitional 
engagement that loving consists in. Even if moral concerns stem from caring, it doesn’t 
mean that they stem from love. Moreover, care is not a sufficient condition for morality, 
since we can care about anything, regardless of its moral status.  
Second, moral reasons generalize: if they apply in one given case, they apply 
across all similar cases. This is not so in love. As Frankfurt points out, love is partial. It 
latches onto a particular individual, bestowing on them a unique non-fungible status. 
Reasons of love do not generalize because the kind of partial concern one has for the 
beloved does not extend to all. Additionally, the kind of commitment that love sometimes 
warrants flies in the face of moral considerations. A lover may be moved to commit 
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immoral acts on behalf of the beloved. If one were to insist that ‘real love’ would never 
motivate one to do anything immoral, one would again beg the question. 
Third, while both love and morality involve disinterested concern for the other, 
the mode and the grounds of concern are different. The way we care for a stranger is not 
the way we care for our beloved. We might care for a stranger because we see them in 
need or in pain. We might be moved to help judging that the person needs help, not 
because it’s our duty to help, or an obligation to help, or because helping is the right thing 
to do. However, even if the content of our moral motivation does not contain notions of 
‘duty’, ‘right’, or ‘ought’, but rather only the specific factors of our situation, such as “this 
person needs my help!”, the mode of concern does not represent the individual as non-
fungible or special, and is not grounded in romantic love.   
Fourth, the notion of care is simply too generic to adequately capture the kind of 
concern present in either love or moral considerations. In the current discussion, care is 
narrowly defined as disinterested concern for the other’s wellbeing. But this is only one 
species of caring. One can care for something instrumentally. In its most general sense 
care only means valuing, or perhaps appreciating the value of something13. Caring 
simpliciter is too thin a concept to differentiate the many states in which it is involved, and 
too basic a concept to be explained in terms of any more complex one such as love or 
morality.   
 If appealing to care does not help in showing that reasons of love are necessarily 
moral reasons, another possible approach is the Duties of Trust approach. It is described 
by R. Jay Wallace in his “Duties of Love” (2012). According to Wallace, there are special 
duties14 of trust, vulnerability, and reciprocity and gratitude that arise from our standing 
in close relationships with those we love. The duties of trust arise from the expectations 
the beloved is led to form, thereby obligating the lover to fulfill those expectations. Duties 
of vulnerability arise with respect to those who are particularly vulnerable to being 
harmed by the one they love. Duties of reciprocity and gratitude also arise from having 
benefited from a lover’s altruistic actions (Wallace 2012, 177-8). These duties are not 
special to romantic relationships. They can arise in many different kinds of human 
interactions. However, they may be particularly salient in romantic relationships given 
their intimate nature, and the closeness and emotional interconnectedness they establish. 
Given their salience, are these moral duties duties of love? Insofar as they arise in 
love contexts, yes. In so far as they are not unique to these contexts, no. Indeed, the fact 
that these duties are not unique to romantic love has been used to deny that there are sui 
generis reasons of love. According to what Wallace calls a reductionist account, whatever 
moral reasons guide any given interpersonal interaction are the same kinds of reasons 
that guide romantic interactions (Wallace 2012, 176-83). That is, there doesn’t seem to be 
a special set of moral duties that arises between the lovers. 
This seems too strong. We might acknowledge that these kinds of moral duties are 
present in romantic love relationships as well as other kinds of interpersonal 
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relationships but deny that these are the only kinds of reasons applicable to love. Indeed, 
since love does have a motivational component, it seems to be able to provide the lovers 
with reasons of its own. These reasons might either stem from the love attitude itself or 
from the romantic love relationship. Given the typical ‘goals’ of love, loving might 
motivate one to seek the company of the beloved, court them in hopes of facilitating 
reciprocation, and take actions that would enable love to continue. Once the relationship 
is formed, it too provides reasons for action by serving as a normative framework for 
interaction. 
One might find this picture of reasons of love too generic. To imbue it with 
specificity it is important to recognize the role that social norms play with respect to love. 
Like all our experiences, our romantic love experiences are informed by our upbringing 
and cultural context. The social norms that we inherit and internalize inform our ideas of 
what kinds of reasons love can provide. For example, social norms elaborate on what sort 
of beloved is appropriate (not a child, a nonhuman animal, and, in not so distant past, 
not someone of the same sex), how love feelings should be experienced (deeply, 
intensely), expressed (romantic words and gestures, intimacy), and acted upon 
(attending to the beloved’s needs, self-sacrifice). The social narratives of romantic love 
have changed over time, and differ across societies (Kim and Hatfield 2004; Mesquita and 
Frijda 1992; Singer 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). To the extent that they determine reasons of love, 
they are not exclusively moral reasons even though they might have the appearance of 
being moral because of their rigidity. 
The apparent rigidity of the reasons of love as supplied by social norms brings us 
to the last approach to the question of whether reasons of love are moral reasons – The 
Moral Deliberation View. It is advanced by Brook Sadler, who argues we should reject 
the idea that social norms provide reasons of love for two reasons: (1) it commits one to 
an uncritical view of what a romantic relationship should be, endorsing an objectionable 
social conservatism, and (2) the social norms are not so clearly defined in a contemporary 
pluralist society (Sadler 2006, 248-9). Rigidly defined norms often promote injustice and 
limit personal freedom. Thus, it is necessary to engage in moral reasoning in order to 
critically assess these norms. Furthermore, since there is disagreement about what the 
norms of love are, in a modern society romantic norms are more like suggestions with 
which the individual lovers engage critically. When we do, we construct our roles as 
lovers (Sadler 2006, 250). This too can be aided by moral deliberation. 
Sadler is right on both counts. The emergence of various forms of ethical non-
monogamy is a case in point. It is particularly poignant because monogamy was and still 
often is taken to be a moral ideal, whereas ethical non-monogamy is viewed as morally 
deficient (for discussion see Brunning 2016; Brake 2017; Jenkins 2017; de Sousa 2017). 
Furthermore, moral deliberation is relevant when faced with a conflicting romantic 
narrative: ‘you are mine’ vs. ‘I love your freedom’; ‘all is fair in love and war’ vs. ‘love 
brings out the best in us’. However, Sadler’s reasoning fails to show that reasons of love 
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are moral reasons. Instead, it demonstrates how moral reasons can figure in the 
assessment of the norms pertaining to romantic love, modifying them, and reconstructing 
the ideal of love. It is clear too that this kind of moral assessment is extrinsic to love. Thus, 
reasons of love cannot be said to be moral reasons in this way.  
Sadler insists, “Moral considerations are formative of how we understand what is 
expected of us and what we are to do in relationships of love and friendship” (Sadler 
2006, 251). However, this is only partially so. On the one hand, reasons of love can be 
critically assessed from the moral standpoint. On the other hand, some reasons of love 
can be moral reasons when they are a part of a romantic narrative. That is, it could well 
be that part of one’s romantic love model – a kind of personal conception of love – is that 
one ought to respect and promote the choices of the beloved, etc.  
At the same time the phrase, ‘I did it because I love you’ can be meaningful 
whatever is substituted for ‘it’. Indeed, love can fail along prudential, moral, and other 
dimensions but it need not fail as love. First, it is clear that love can motivate us to lie, 
cheat, steal, and murder on our beloved’s behalf.15 The ultimate sacrifice of one’s moral 
self for the sake of the beloved could be the categorical manifestation of one’s romantic 
commitment. Becoming a culprit, sharing the blame, or simply assisting the beloved’s 
ends are all plausible reasons of love. Second, love can move the lover to do the very same 
things to the beloved: lie, cheat, steal, and even murder them. These actions can be either 
construed as deeply mistaken acts of beneficence as when the lover lies to protect the 
beloved’s feelings or murders them to rid them of unhappiness and angst of existence, or 
as malevolent actions intended to harm: ‘I wish you were dead because I love you’ or ‘I 
wish you to suffer because I love you’ are perfectly intelligible utterances love might 
motivate. ‘If he doesn’t hit you, he doesn’t love you’ has been a common attitude among 
women across cultures (Ben-Ze’ev and Goussinsky 2008).  
It is important to recognize that appealing to love in justifying one’s abhorrent 
actions has little merit.16 Yet, it is also important to recognize that these can be reasons of 
love, nonetheless. This is evident from the contradictory narratives of love in our and 
other societies. Furthermore, an even greater specificity with respect to reasons of love 
can be achieved by looking at individual lovers, discerning their ideas of what love is, 
and how they practice them. An individual’s history, their attachment style17, their 
conceptions of love informed by family histories, personal experiences, and the cultural 
narratives they inherit, all contribute to the determination of what reasons of love are for 
them. Indeed, having different conceptions of love is often a cause of great tension 
between lovers. Given the multitude of factors that contribute to one’s reasons of love, 
their diversity is not surprising. Some of these reasons can be moral reasons if they are a 
part of one’s love model. Yet, it seems that any reason can be a reason of love. Therefore, 
reasons of love are not reducible to moral reasons. 
 After surveying the three views that attempts to show that reasons of love are 
moral reasons, it seems clear that reasons of love can be both moral and nonmoral. For 
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this reason I think the right view of the reasons of love is the hybrid view: reasons of love 
can be of both kinds. Even though morality and love have care in common, that shared 
element does not establish that reasons of love are exclusively moral. The Duties of Trust 
View demonstrates that some reasons of love can be moral in so far as they arise from 
moral duties one acquires when one enters an intimate relationship. However, these 
duties are not exclusive to love; neither are they exhaustive. Lastly, the Moral 
Deliberation View accurately shows that moral deliberation is relevant in a romantic love 
context: a moral assessment of reasons of love is often desirable. But that does not show 
that reasons of love are intrinsically moral. Furthermore, it remains an open question 




Conclusion   
 
I have tried to show that romantic love is not an intrinsically moral phenomenon by 
arguing that neither reasons for love nor reasons of love are necessarily moral. Reasons 
for love are not as such moral because lovability is not necessarily a moral property. It 
can be grounded neither in the Kantian notion of personhood, nor in a collection of moral 
virtues. The Kantian notion is a nonstarter because personhood is a property possessed 
by most beloveds in a romantic context – most beloveds are persons. It is also too generic, 
which makes it incompatible with the particularity and partiality of love. It is not 
grounded in moral virtues because if love’s function were to track the moral character of 
the beloved, virtuous people would be loved more than those of devious character. Yet, 
it seems, all kinds of people are loved, and an antihero is just as stereotypical a romantic 
protagonist as a virtuous person. 
 Reasons of love are not intrinsically moral reasons because love can provide both 
moral and nonmoral reasons. Some reasons of love conflict with morality not only 
because love might endorse immoral acts on behalf of the beloved but also towards the 
beloved. This is so because cultural scripts, family history, prior experience and many 
other factors contribute to one’s model of love, and, therefore, to the range of reasons that 
love might be credited with providing. It is possible to critically assess a particular set of 
reasons of love from a moral as well as prudential standpoints. In the end, it is up to the 
lovers themselves to determine which reasons are reasons of love, and whether some are 









2 Although there may not be a duty to love someone romantically, perhaps other kinds of love such as a 
parent’s love for a child can be said to be obligatory. See Liao 2015. But also Protasi 2019.  
3 I argue elsewhere that romantic love is not grounded in reasons of any kind (Pismenny and Prinz 2017; 
Pismenny 2018). I will not defend this view here but assume for the purposes of this paper that there can 
be reasons for love.  
4 Velleman explicitly denies that his account applies to passionate love. He says, “When I say that love is a 
moral emotion, what I have in mind is the love between close adult friends and relations—including 
spouses and other life-partners, insofar as their love has outgrown the effects of overvaluation and 
transference” (Velleman 1999, 351). Since his account applies to spouses and life-partners, however, he 
must have in mind companionate though not passionate love. 
5 There have been numerous articles criticizing Velleman’s view. See, for instance, Millgram 2004 and 
Callcut 2005. 
6 See also the much discussed piece by Bernard Williams (Williams 1981). 
7 I thank Christopher Grau for this point. 
8 The scare quotes are intended to mark the numerous ways in which the pejorative connotation of the 
phrase is problematic. 
9 For a comprehensive criticism of the view that love should be directed at moral traits see Smuts 2014.  
10 Frankfurt explicitly rejects passionate love as ‘real love’ because it is rarely disinterested (Frankfurt 
1999, 166; 2004, 43). Instead, he argues that paradigms of ‘real love’ include self-love and love for one’s 
children.   
11 Frankfurt himself thinks that love is the source of final value: “Love is the originating source of terminal 
value. If we loved nothing, then nothing would possess for us any definitive and inherent worth. There 
would be nothing that we found ourselves in any way constrained to accept as a final end. By its very 
nature, loving entails both that we regard its objects as valuable in themselves and that we have no choice 
but to adopt those objects as our final ends. Insofar as love is the creator both of inherent or terminal 
value and of importance, then, it is the ultimate ground of practical rationality.” (Frankfurt 2004, 55-6).   
12 For a developed account of care ethics and critique of deontology and consequentialism see Held 2006.  
13 Frankfurt himself develops an account of caring which he distinguishes from valuing (Frankfurt 1999). 
According to it, to care is to be committed to having a desire such that it is not discarded or neglected but 
continues to occupy an important place among one’s preferences (Frankfurt 1999, 162). The person is 
unwilling to give it up. For example, if one truly cares about being a virtuous person, one would be 
unwilling to let go of that desire. Care is volitional, and love, a species of care, is also volitional. While to 
value would be to appreciate the value of a particular person, say, to care is to be committed to continue 
to desire the good of that person for its own sake.     
14 Wallace concentrates on defending the sui generis duties of love rather than simply reasons (see also 
Frankfurt 1998, 2004).    
15 See Cocking and Kennett 2000. 
16 See, for example, Peter Stearns’ analysis of the defense in the so-called ‘crimes of passion’ (2010). Men 
(but not women) were often acquitted for killing their adulterous spouses.    
17 On attachment see Bowlby 1969; Ainsworth et al. 1978; Hazan and Shaver 1987; van Ijzendoorn and 
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